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FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN FIELD WAREHOUSING*
H~AoLD F. BRmNBAUMt
The inventory of a merchant or manufacturer is in many cases the reason why
he needs credit and at the same time the soundest basis for extending credit to him.
Inventory is capital, in the most orthodox sense of that term. Inventory is
goods-surplus which has not-been consumed.
Whether we look at the largest manufacturer or the smallest merchant, the
well-established concern or the person who is just gathering funds with which to
start, the same analysis holds true: he needs inventory before he can commence
operations or open his doors. Someone's capital, someone's accumulated savings,
must be placed at his disposal before he can start.
Capital is also required for machinery and fixtures and in order to carry re-
ceivables until they are converted into cash. However, the requirements of capital
for inventory are always fundamental.
An appreciation of this analysis is essential to an understanding of the various
types of inventory financing and to an appraisal of the legal and socio-economic
problems which must be encountered and solved as a prerequisite to the sound
functioning of this portion of the banking phases of our business system.
Trust receipt, factor's lien, chattel mortgage, pledge, consignment, commercial
warehousing and field warehousing are all different methods of supplying capital
for inventory on a secured basis, just as sales on credit to a business, bank borrowings,
and long-term credits may, on an unsecured basis, supplement the capital directly
invested.
A conclusion as to whether any or al of these security transactions should be
encouraged and facilitated requires consideration of their functioning, recognition
of the fact that they are only methods and not results, and adoption of a business
philosophy which will reduce the friction or waste with which desirable methods
can be employed.
I
THE MEcHANIcs oF FIELD WAREHOUSING
Field warehousing accomplishes the same end result as a direct pledge of the
goods. This is done through a bailment of the goods in the true sense of the word,
*The cases in this field are assembled in Friedman, Field Warehousing, 42 COL. L. REv. 9gx (1942);
Kane, The Theory of Field Warehotsing, 12 ,VAsH. L. REv. 20 (1937); Note, ig CALIF. L. REv. 333
(193x); 133 A. L. R. 209, ep. 234-250. Operating problems are discussed in WasLEx J. SCHNEIDER,
FIELD VAREstousiNo (941), RAYMOND J. SAULxIER AND NEIL H. JACOBY, FINANCING INWNTORY ON
FIELD VAREIHOUSE RECEIPTs 3 (1944). See also P-H BANE.R. SERV. §2200I.
t A.B. 1920, University of Colorado: LL.B. 1923, Harvard Law School. Member of Massachusetts,
New York, and California bars. Author, The Auto Finance Consent Decree-A New Technique in
Enforcing the Sherman Act, 24 WAsH. U. L. Q. 525 (1939).
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followed by a pledge of documents of title which have roots in the same law mer-
chant from which we obtained bills of exchange, bills of lading, and other necessities
of commerce.
I. The first step is to effect a change of possession of the inventory, by delivery
to a third party as bailee.
2. The next step is for the bailee to give a receipt for the inventory so delivered.
3. The third step is for the bailor to pledge the receipt to the lender as security
for the loan.
The mechanics of field warehousing are often attacked as being more form than
substance. This results in basic problems, both business and legal.
II
ELEMENTS OF "FORM" IN T-E DELIVERY OF PossEssIoN
The first element of form is the location of the warehouse on the borrower's
premises--"in the field"--hence the derivation of the operation's name. A corner
of the factory premises is fenced off, or a room in a factory building is locked. This
segregated area is leased to a warehouse company for a nominal rent and constitutes
the warehouse.
The second element of form is the structure of the warehouse company. Some-
times it is one of several which engage in field warehousing throughout the country
as their sole business. Sometimes it is a corporation especially organized, or an
individual especially selected, for the single operation between the particular bor-
rower and lender.
The third element of form is the personnel of the warehouse company. Con-
ventionally, the personnel is limited to one individual who is selected from among
the employees of the borrower,2 covered by a fidelity bond, and put on the payroll
of the warehouse company. His employment is femporary, for the duration of the
warehouse operation, and he expects to go back on the borrower's payroll after the
warehousing terminates. In addition to his duties as manager of the warehouse
company, he continues to perform his regular duties for the borrower while the
warehousing is in effect.
The fourth element of form is the compensation of the warehouse company.
The warehouse charges are sufficient only to cover the nominal rent and the salary
of the single employee, plus the premium on his fidelity bond. When the operation
is administered by a company engaged in the business on a nationwide scale, the
warehouse charges also include a relatively moderate supervisory fee. However, the
' Such a lease has been held not to violate a covenant against subleasing. Mercury Electronic Lab.
oratories v. Krug, 330 Ill. App. 336, 7 N. E. 2d 104 (1947).
Under the United States Warehouse Act, 39 S-rAr. 486 (i916), 7 U. S. C. §241 (1940), the Ad-
ministrator will not license a warehouse supervised by former personnel (see H. S. YoRE, FIELD ,VARE-
HousE RECEi'Ts--CoLLATE AL OR No COLLATERAL (Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Dep't of
Agric. 3937)); and bankers' acceptances secured by receipts issued by a warehouse with such super-
vision are not eligible for rediscount (see 23 FED. Ras. BULL. 518 (1937)). The courts generally give
validity to such warehouse receipts (see cases cited below; esp. notes 19 and 22).
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elements of capital investment, risk, and profit incident to a normal commercial
warehousing enterprise are never present.
The fifth element of form is the facilities of the warehouse. Even though the
bailee has actual possession, neither the fence on the lot nor the lock on the door
is regarded by any of the parties as being physically strong enough to afford ade-
quate protection against a determined attempt at forcible entry by the borrower.
As far as the borrower is concerned, they remind one of Mary Garden's strapless
evening gown: "It is held up by your self-restraint, Mr. Depew." There are no
burglar-proof doors to the warehouse and no separate fire alarms; refrigeration or
other special protective facilities are supplied by the borrower.
The sixth element of form is the exclusiveness of the warehouse. Warehousing
is ordinarily a public calling, like that of a common carrier or a public weighmaster.
The ordinary warehouseman will store the goods of all who offer, aid his "nego-
tiable warehouse receipts" are given currency as documents of title on that basis.
The field warehouseman, on the other hand, is physically incapable and practically
unwilling to act for more than one party at the same field warehouse.
When there is rigorous adherence to the formal requirements of possession by
the bailee-warehousemen, these elements of form have real substance and are given
legal validity. As a result, the practical business interests are well served by the in-
genious adaptation of general mechanics to the requirements of a specific commer-
cial enterprise.
The most important requirement is to avoid unnecessary handling and trans-
portation. It would be an economic waste to move a manufacturer's finished in-
ventory, which is awaiting sale or delivery, from the factory to a public warehouse
for storage until shipment, so long as space is available on the borrower's premises.
Whether the product is finished lumber, canned food, wine in casks, or coal, no
good business purpose is served by merely moving it from one resting place to
another.
Where the commodity is raw material, the convenience of the borrower is also
served by the location of the warehouse on his premises. The commodity may be
eggs waiting to be powdered, steel to be fabricated, or tubes, condensers, and other
parts to be assembled into a radio. Unless the goods are at hand, and can be used
as a whole or selected by grades and quantities without delay, the operation is not
practical.
The same considerations apply to personnel. No field warehouse requires the
full-time services of all the men and machines which it uses. The manager and the
clerical help, the trucks, hoists, and labeling apparatus-these and all else would be
idle most of the time if devoted solely to the service of the warehouse.
The statement made by Mr. Justice Brandeis in connection with the development
of loan receipts in the field of marine insurance is equally applicable to field ware-
housing:
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It is creditable to the ingenuity of business men that an arrangement should have been
devised which is consonant both with the needs of commerce and the demands of justice.3
III
PROBLEMS OF BUSINESS SUBSTANCE IN FIELD WAREHOUSING
Most of the business problems are not such as to require extended discussion in
the present article. In the first place, loans on goods in a field warehouse are com-
modity loans. They are sound to the extent that the commodity is salable, and the
lender must gauge the extent of the loan in the light of fluctuating commodity
prices.
Second, the lender must establish his own safeguards as to the intrinsic value
of the warehoused goods. Generally, he relies on the borrower's count, as certified
by the borrower's employee who is now the bonded manager of the warehouse.
Common prudence requires at least periodic physical test-checks as to quantity and
quality, to be made by the lender's own employees or by actually independent
agencies. Unless this is done the lender may wake up too late and find a serious
shortage, too large to be covered by the employee's fidelity bond; or else the lender
may discover that the canned applesauce has become unsalable because of discolora-
tion due to unanticipated chemical reaction inside the container; or the lender may
find that, although the inventory was properly balanced at the outset, the woolen
goods left in the warehouse are flannels when the market currendy demands
gabardines.
Third, the transition from raw materials to finished goods calls for flexibility
and accuracy. For example, the field warehouse may be operated in connection
with a powdered-egg plant. When the raw eggs are delivered into the warehouse
they must be covered by warehouse receipts and valued as collateral. The following
day they must be released to the processing department, whereupon they cease to
be covered by the warehouse receipt. After the processing is completed the cases
of powdered eggs go into the warehouse, are covered by new warehouse receipts,
and are revalued as collateral. This procedure requires accurate instructions and
record-keeping so far as the warehouse manager is concerned, and also raises a
separate problem concerning possible "preferences" in case of bankruptcy.4
This problem may be illustrated as follows: Suppose that on March I the loan
to an egg-powdering plant, as a typical processor for field-warehousing purposes, is
$ioo,ooo, and is secured by warehouse receipts covering raw eggs at a market value
of $6oooo and powdered eggs at a market value of $6oooo, under a loan agreement
'Luckenbach v. McCahan Sugar Refining Co., 248 U. S. 139, 149 (1918).
"In re Baumgartner, 55 F. 2d 1041, 1047 (C. C. A. 7th 1931); Wolfc v. Bank of Anderson, 238
Fed. 343 (C. C. A. 4 th 1916). The problem is similar to that involving "day loans" by banks to stock-
brokers. National City Bank v. Hotchkiss, 231 U. S. 50 (1913); Mechanics' & Metals National Bank v.
Ernst, 231 U. S. 6o (1913); cf. Sexton v. Kessler & Co., 225 U. S. 90 (1912). The business necessity
of day loans was recognized in New York by statutory protection through an amendment to Section 230
of the New York Lien Law. N. Y. IEN LAw §230, c. 33. Irving Trust Co. v. Bank of America
National Ass'n, 68 F. 2d 887 (C. C. A. 2d 1934).
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requiring the maintenance of collateral in the ratio of six to five.5 Assume that the
borrower is on that date known to be insolvent; but the lender does not enforce
his remedies regarding the loan, expecting that the borrower may be able to work
himself out of his financial difficulties. Day after day raw eggs are released from
the warehouse for processing. While they are being processed they are no longer
in the possession of the warehouse nor covered by the warehouse receipt. After
processing is finished, powdered eggs are delivered into the warehouse and new
receipts are issued. After some weeks, the borrower's expectations are disappointed
and bankruptcy results. Are all of the pledges of warehouse receipts, covering
powdered eggs delivered into the warehouse after the lender knew of the insolvency,
to be treated as voidable preferences in bankruptcy? Such a result would be a
windfall to general creditors and would discourage continued help from secured
creditors when it is most needed. However, unless this result is to follow, careful
4iechanics must be arranged in advance and adhered to so that substitution of col-
lateral can be effected simultaneously with or in advance of the release of collateral-
i.e., the substitution must occur at or before the time when the raw eggs are released,
and not at the time when the powdered eggs are delivered to the warehouse.8
IV
WHO MAY BE Tro WAREHOUSEmAN?
The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act has now been adopted throughout the
United States, including the District of Columbia, Alaska, and Puerto Rico, and
in the Philippines. Section I of the Act provides that "warehouse receipts may be
issued by any warehouseman." Section 58 of the Act defines a warehouseman as
Ica person lawfully engaged in the business of storing goods for profit."
The issue whether the borrower may set up a company or an individual to act
solely as warehouseman for the borrower's goods, for the purpose of a field-ware-
' Conceivably, the loan agreement may provide for repayments to the lender whenever any raw
material is released from the warehouse for processing or any finished goods are released for shipment,
and for fresh loans to the borrower whenever any raw material or finished goods are delivered to the
warehouse. In practice, the parties frequently seek to avoid what they regard as red tape and prefer to
reduce the number of payments and repayments by having the loan remain at a stationary amount so
long as it is adequately secured.
SMre exchange of collateral is not a preference. IV-A REMINGTON oN BANxitwpTY §1673 (5th ed.
1943). In jurisdictions where trust receipts are valid, either at common law or under the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act, and to the extent that they are upheld under §6oa of the Bankruptcy Act, the in-
ventory in process can be covered under trust receipts. The warehouse receipt on raw eggs is exchanged
for a trust receipt, which is later exchanged for a warehouse receipt on powdered eggs. In other juris-
dictions it was the writer's practice to instruct the warehouseman that he was authorized to release col-
lateral on a particular day only if the total collateral on deposit at the close of the previous day exceeded
the agreed minimum by at least the amount to be released. For example, in the illustration under
consideration, if the total value of raw and powdered eggs on deposit at the close of one day was
$Sa8,ooo, the warehouseman was authorized to release up to $8,ooo of raw eggs for processing on the
following day. It is clear that the lender must insist on literal obedience to such instructions and
cannot acquiesce in a practice of releasing whatever amount the borrower may desire in excess of the
permitted quantity. In re C. A. Taylor Log & Lumber Co., 4 F. ad 249 (W. D. Wash. 1925). The
practice described was never tested in court in any instance where it was employed, but it is believed
to be sound. Cf. In re Pusey, Maynes, Breish Co., 122 F. 2d 6o6 (C. C. A. 3d 1941).
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housing operation, has been passed upon in a number of cases arising under the Act.
In Citizen's Bank v. Willing,7 the borrower, Red Cedar Company, organized a
warehouse company under the name of Fidalgo Warehouse Company. Salmon-box
shooks, upon manufacture by the borrower, were placed in a separate room or shed
on the borrower's premises and a negotiable warehouse receipt was issued therefor
by the warehouse company and deposited by the borrower with a bank as collateral.
After quoting the definition of "warehouseman" from the Act, the court held:
In this case the Fidalgo Warehouse Company had no separate building of its own; it did
not store goods for the public generally or at all; it only stored the product of the Red
Cedar Company in a room or shed upon the premises of that company. It was simply
a device by which the bank was furnished negotiable warehouse receipt[s] as collateral
security for the loans which it had made to the Red Cedar Company. The evidence fails
to show that the warehouse company was storing goods for profit, and therefore it would
not come within the statutory definition. 8
In Continental Can Company v. Jessamine Canning CompanyO Jessamine Can-
ning Company by resolution of its directors agreed to place its canned goods in the
custody of F. D. Smith, Jr., its bookkeeper, as warehouseman. It then ran a wire
partition through its building, cutting off the space in which the manufactured
product was stored from the other part of the building where its machinery was
installed and operated. Pursuant to the agreement, the warehouseman issued ne-
gotiable warehouse receipts, which were pledged to secure loans. The plaintiff
attached the warehoused goods. The Kentucky court, also in reliance on the statu-
tory definition, as well as on the basis of cases decided before the adoption of the
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, held that the term "warehouseman" referred only
to persons engaged in the business of storing goods, not only for themselves and
m their own plant, but for others as well.
Thus it is clear that the warehouseman cannot be a mere dummy, but must be
a person engaged in the business of storing goods for profit. The borrower's com-
pany clearly does not fall within this category. An independent warehouse company
clearly does.
Probably a lender who is engaged in large-scale field-warehousing operations
and who possesses corporate power to own a warehouse subsidiary could set up
a warehouse company to engage in the business of operating such warehouses for
profit at the various locations where the goods of the various borrowers are to be
stored. Such a warehouse company would seem to qualify under the statutory
definition, if operated for profit and on a sufficiently wide scale. Further than this
it would be unsafe to go.
In Lippincott Distributing Co. v. Peoples Commercial and Savings Bank 10 the
officers of the borrower, Union Grocers, Inc., organized the Union Commercial
o9 Wash. 464, x86 Pac. 1072 (1920).
I1d. at 1074.
.286 Ky. 365, 150 S. W. 2d 922 (r941).
20 137 Ohio St. 399, 30 N. E. 2d 691 (1940).
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Warehouse Company. The two companies had interlocking officers and the ware-
house company occupied the same building as the borrower. The merchandise
consigned to Union Grocers was placed in the warehouse and warehouse receipts
were pledged with a bank. In litigation between the consignor of the goods and
the bank it was argued that the Union Commercial Warehouse Company was not
a bona fide warehouseman under the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act. The court
held in favor of the bank on the ground that, so far as the bank knew or had reason
to believe, the Union Commercial Warehouse Company was a bona fide warehouse
company. Regardless of the correctness of this holding on the facts, upon the basis
of which the doctrine of estoppel was invoked against the consignor, the case is
no authority to support the practice of setting up individual warehouse companies
for single borrowing operations.
V
PoSSESsIoN O THE WAREHOUSE
The leading case on field warehousing is Union Trust Company v. W4lson.11
The facts are stated in the opinion:
The bankrupt, Flanders, was a wholesale leather dealer. He walled off a part of 'the
basement of his place of business, and let it at a nominal rent to the Security Warehousing
Company. There were doors to this part, with padlocks bearing the name of the com-
pany, which were kept locked and to which the company had the only keys. The com-
pany had a key to Flanders' front door and access to the part let to it, at all hours of day
or night. No one else could get such access without breaking in. There were two signs
on the outside, stating in large letters that the premises were occupied by the company as
a public warehouseman. The company received leather from Flanders into this place,
issuing a certificate that it had received the same on storage subject to the order of H. L.
Flanders & Co., and identifying the leather; "said commodity to be retained on storage
and delivered only upon surrender of this receipt properly endorsed and payment of all
charges thereon." To every parcel of the leather was attached a card legibly stating that
it was in the possession of the Warehouse Company. The company stipulated in the
receipt against liability for damage by fire, water, etc., and by a general contract with
Flanders the latter assumed all risk of loss except from dishonesty of the company's ser-
vants. Flanders paid the company twenty dollars a month for the first $io,ooo worth of
property or less, and a dollar a month for each additional $iooo. He also paid the
expenses of the company in connection with storing the goods. The certificates of the
company issued as above were all endorsed by Flanders to the Union Trust Company as
security for loans made by it to him in the regular course of business. If Flanders desired
to remove any part of the leather he paid the necessary sum to the Trust Company, was
entrusted with the receipts, got the Warehouse Company to send a man to unlock the
place of enclosure and allow the removal, endorsing on the receipt the amount delivered
if less than all, and then, as the case might be, returned the receipt to the Trust Company
or surrendered it into the Warehousing Company's hands.1 2
The opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice Holmes, sustains the validity of
the warehousing transaction. The Court first held that the principle of law involved
2 198 U. S. 530 (1905).
12 Id. at 534-535.
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was that of bailment. It then held that the warehousing company had possession
of the goods because it had them under lock and key in a place to which it had a
legal tide and right of access by lease. The Court went on to speak as follows:
We deal with the case before us only. No doubt there are other cases in which the
exclusive power of the so-called bailee gradually tapers away until we reach those in
which the courts have held as matter of law that there was no adequate bailment. Bank
v. Jagode, 186 Pa. St. 556; Drury v. Moors, 171 Massachusetts, 252. So, different views
have been entertained where the owner has undertaken to constitute himself a bailee by
issuing a receipt. We may concede, for purposes of argument, that all the forms gone
through in this case might be emptied of significance by a different understanding be-
tween the parties, which the form was intended to disguise. But no such understanding
is stated here, and it cannot be assumed. There is no reason even to infer it as a conclu-
sion of fact, if such inferences were open to us to draw. It is true that the evident motive
of Flanders was to get his goods represented by a document for convenience of pledging
rather than to get them stored, and the method and amount of compensation -show it.
But that was a lawful motive and did not invalidate his acts if otherwise sufficient. He
could get the goods by producing the receipt and paying charges, of course, but there is
no hint that the company did not insist upon its control. It is suggested that the goods
gave credit to the owner. But, in answer to this, it is enough to say that the goods were
not visible to any one entering the shop. They could be surmised only by going to the
basement, where signs gave notice of the company's possession, and probably could be
seen only if the company unlocked the doors. There is nothing stated which warrants
us in doubting that all the transactions were in good faith.' 8
The principles of the Wilson case run through all the other decisions in which
the courts are called on to determine whether the bailee-warehouseman has open,
notorious, and exclusive possession-or, in the language of Mr. Justice Holmes,
"conscious control, the intent to exclude and the exclusion of others, with access to
the place of custody as of right."' 4
For example, in In re Rodgers,'5 where the court refused to uphold the validity
of the operation, it said:
We are thus brought to the consideration of the real character and purpose of the
transaction between the bankrupt and the storage company. We are to ascertain the
real intention of the contracting parties from the whole agreement read in the light of
the surrounding circumstances. The bankrupt was largely engaged in purchasing seed
upon credit, storing the property purchased in his warehouse. He occupied the premises
as a place of business, maintaining an office there, with clerks to assist in the management
of the business, and with porters to handle the seed. The premises were subject to a
rental of $25o. a month. He arranged with the storage company, which had no warehouse
of its own, that it would issue warehouse warrants or receipts to the bankrupt for prop-
erty upon the bankrupt's premises for a certain small charge per month upon the value of
the property covered by the receipts. He executed a lease of the premises to the storage
company, to continue so long as the bankrupt should desire, and so long as property




12 125 Fed. 169 (C. C. A. 7th 1903).
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payment of rent by the storage company, the rental in fact being paid by the bankrupt.
The storage company neither required, nor was it given, any key to the premises. The
bankrupt remained in possession of the premises as before the agreement, continuing to
transact his business there as he had formerly done. There were certain signs placed
upon the different floors of the building, indicating that the storage company controlled
the premises. These were small and obscure signs, not likely to attract attention, and most
of them hidden behind the piles of bags of seed. No sign was displayed upon the ex-
terior of the building indicating any proprietorship of the storage company, or giving
notice to the world that any other than the bankrupt had possession and control. There
was no open, notorious manifestation of a change of possession, none was intended, and
there was none in fact. Upon each pile of bags of seed for which the warehouse receipts
or warrants were issued there was placed a small tag, which might be discovered upon
careful search. The bankrupt substantially treated this property as his own, at times
going through the forms prescribed by the storage company, and, whenever he found
it necessary, ignoring them. We do not find that the storage company had knowledge
of this action of the bankrupt, but it certainly knew that it was possible under the cir-
cumstances for the bankrupt to do with the property as he would, since it was left within
his control.
It is difficult for us to look upon this transaction as a warehousing of property. The
storage company assumed no liability to the bankrupt, and assumed only such responsi-
bility as the law imposes upon it with respect to those advancing money upon the faith
of its warehouse warrants or receipts. The name of the company is in itself, under the
circumstances, a false pretense. It did not store property. It had no premises upon which
to store property. The bankrupt stored the property. The bankrupt paid the rental of
the premises. It is true that an agent of the storage company occasionally visited the
premises and inspected the property in a sort of a way, but exercised no supervision or
control that would prevent the bankrupt from doing with it as his will might dictate
or his financial necessities might require. We cannot but regard this arrangement as a
subterfuge, a mere device to enable the bankrupt to hypothecate the warehouse warrants
or receipts, and so to raise money upon secret liens upon property in his possession and
under his control. The written agreement indicates this. It is somewhat startling to
learn that a warehouse company should store goods of this character for another upon
the premises of that other, taking compensation as for storage, not related to the cost of
storage, or to the expense of receiving and delivering the property, not according to the
space occupied by the property, but according to the value of the property. The fact
here is patent that the storage company assumed to the bankrupt no liability, and that
the sole purpose was to issue warehouse warrants or receipts, making such inspection only
as, in its judgment, would protect it from liability to third persons by reason of the issue
of its warrants. To uphold such a scheme would permit every merchant in the state,
notwithstanding the declared policy of the state to the contrary, to have possession of
large stocks, thereby inducing credit, and to cover them with secret liens, thereby deceiving
creditors. It would, in effect, permit such merchant to pledge his entire stock without
change of possession, without record of it, and without notice to the world. Such a
scheme is disapproved by the law of the state of Illinois, which in this instance we are
bound to uphold, however specious may be the device or however attractive may be the
form by which it is cloaked. Such a scheme within the state of Illinois is constructively
fraudulent as to creditors, and voidable by creditors.'0
10 d. at 177-179.
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This case should be contrasted with two recent cases in which properly designed
warehousing operations were sustained.
In Heffron v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association,17 the
facts were stated by the court as follows:
The bankrupt, a wholesale and retail merchant in the city of Los Angeles, was engaged
in the sale of unfabricated steel of various kinds and dimensions. He kept a portion of
his inventory and maintained his office at 633 South Anderson Street, and deliveries were
made from this address. A small part of the front was occupied by the bankrupt as his
office and the balance of the building was used for the storage of steel, the warehouse
portion being separated from the office by walls or partitions through which there was
a door.
Desiring to procure credit on the security of his stock, the bankrupt on July 2o, 1937,
entered into a leasing and field warehouse storage agreement with the Lawrence Ware-
house Company, operating an extensive system of field warehouses, to establish a ware-
house on his premises. Under this agreement the bankrupt leased to the Warehouse
Company the building mentioned, with the exception of the office, for the yearly rental
of one dollar. The Warehouse Company undertook to act as custodian of all goods
then on the premises and of any other goods placed there, in consideration of the sum of
fifty cents per ton per month for goods stored which were covered by warehouse receipts,
with a minimum charge of $5oo for the first year. It conspicuously marked the building,
inside and out, with "No Trespassing" placards and with large signs bearing the name
of the Warehouse Company and a statement to the effect that "all commodities in or
upon these premises are in the custody of the Lawrence Warehouse Company, Lessee."
It placed in charge a man named Rennie as its bonded custodian.
Rennie had previously been employed by the bankrupt as his warehouse clerk. The
new employment was at the same salary as previously received from the bankrupt, and
as part of the compensation to the Warehouse Company for its services the amount of
Rennie's salary was included. Padlocks bearing the name of the Company, to which
the custodian had the only keys were placed on the entrances to the warehouse, and the
custodian kept the place locked when he was not present. With Rennie's permission
the bankrupt had access to the warehouse. Except that he no longer drove a truck,
Rennie continued to do the same character of work he had previously performed in and
about the warehouse premises.
About July 28, 1937, the Warehouse Company issued non-negotiable warehouse receipts
by the terms of which it acknowledged receipt from the bankrupt of the steel therein
described, and agreed to hold it subject to the written order of the California Bank. The
receipts were delivered by the Company to the bankrupt and thereafter by the latter
delivered to the California Bank as collateral for a present loan. A few days later the
bankrupt negotiated for loans with appellee. As a result of the negotiations the bank-
rupt from time to time caused the Warehouse Company to issue additional non-negotiable
warehouse receipts, which he delivered to appellee as security for loans. These, similar
in form to the first, provided that the goods were to be held for the written order of
appellee. The goods covered by receipts used in the transaction with the California
Bank were included,in receipts subsequently issued to appellee, and the loan of the Cali-
fornia Bank was paid off from the new loans procured from appellee.
As warehouse receipts were issued, cards showing the name of the pledgee and the
amount of steel covered were placed on the various piles of steel included in the receipts.
17 X13 F. 2d 239 (C. C. A. 9 th 1940).
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These cards described the steel by number of pieces and their dimensions and referred to
the warehouse receipts by number. While there was considerable "free" steel in the
bins or shelves, it was the custom to separate the free goods from the pledged goods by
a steel band or wire. No pledged steel was sold without first procuring a release.' 8
The referee in bankruptcy held that there had been no actual and continued
change of possession of the goods and that the purported transfer was void as against
the trustee in bankruptcy. The district court reversed and was affirmed by the
circuit court of appeals in the following language:
The circumstances disclose no mere colorable relinquishment of dominion over the
goods. The substituted finding of the trial court of an immediate delivery to the Ware-
house Company, followed by an actual and continued change of possession, is war-
ranted by the proof. Compare Union Trust Co. v. Wilson, 198 U. S. 530, 25 S. Ct. 766
49 L. Ed. 1154; Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand, 2o6 U. S. 415, 27 S. Ct. 720, 51
L. Ed. rii7, ii Ann. Cas. 789.* There is nothing in McCaffey Canning Co. v. Bank
of America, io9 Cal. App. 415, 294 P. 45, 53, to justify a contrary view.
As said in the McCaffey case, supra, "warehousing on the premises of the owner
proposing to pledge his merchandise is effective when done in obedience to legal re-
quirements." It is immaterial that the purpose of the warehousing is to enable the mer-
chant to finance himself on the security of his goods by the use of warehouse receipts.
Such is the primary and legitimate objective of modern field warehousing. Union Trust
Co. v. Wilson, supra.
* [Footnote by the court] Consult authorities cited in 12 Washington L. Review 2o
(1937), "The Theory of Field Warehousing.' x9
The Heffron case is also of interest because it involved consideration of whether
the field-warehouse operation was valid under the California statute relating to mort-
gages of a stock of trade in bulk. 0 It held that Section 3440 of the California Civil
Code was repealed by the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act in so far as it was ap-
plicable to warehoused goods, and that the subsequent enactment of Section 3440.521
was merely a clarification of existing law, or was intended to remove doubts
prompted by litigation such as the Heffron case.
In Pittman v. Union Planters National Bank & Trust Company, 2 the operation
of the warehouse system was described by the court as follows:
The method of warehousing pursued by the bankrupt is known as the field ware-
housing system. In order to avail itself of inventory for credit purposes, the bankrupt
entered into an agreement with the Nashville Warehouse and Elevator Corporation for
Id. at 240-241.
'9Id. at 242.
"CAL. Civ. CODE §3440 ('94').
a "Sec. 3440.5. Same: Limitation on Application of Rule: Goods for Which Warehouse Receipt has
Issued: Necessity for Retention of Copy. Section 3440 of this code shall not apply to goods in a ware-
house where a warehouse receipt has been issued therefor by a warehouseman as defined in the Ware-
house lkeceipts Act, and a copy of such receipt is kept at the principal place of business of the ware-
houseman and at the warehouse in which said goods are stored. Such copy shall be open to inspection
upon written order of the owner or lawful holder of such receipt." (Added by Stats. 1939, p. 2840;
Am. Stats. 1941, c. 1142, §1.) CA l. CXv. CODE §3440.5 (941).
22 iiS F. 2d 211 (C. C. A. 6th 1941).
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the warehousing of its cottonseed. No convenient storage facilities being available, the
bankrupt leased to the Warehousing Company its own storage facilities at points in
Arkansas, Illinois, and Tennessee, with an agreement by the Warehousing Company
that it would furnish the necessary employees for safe warehousing, and issue warehouse
receipts for goods stored with it, for a consideration over and above necessary expenses,
and a guarantee by the bankrupt against loss or damage in connection with such storage
not due to its own fault. The Warehousing Company appointed one of the bankrupt's
employees at each mill as custodian and required of him a fidelity bond, and a daily
written report of quantities of cottonseed and products received, disposed of, and re-
maining on hand. The head warehouseman was stationed in the bankrupt's main office
where he compiled and kept a master record of quantities on hand and withdrawn upon
warehouse receipts made up from the daily reports furnished him by the mill warehouse-
men. The system followed when the R. F. C. held the collateral was continued after
the banks took over the loans.
The appellant concedes that field warehousing may validly be carried on, and that
the issue of warehouse receipts will afford valid security to the holders when the ware-
houseman takes and maintains sole, open and actual possession of the stored property.
He contends that this was not true of the present system and assails the warehousing as
merely colorable. While the receipts may have been in proper form, he points to nu-
merous circumstances invalidating the security. The warehouse facilities, he says, were
upon the properties of the bankrupt to which it had access; the warehousemen were its
employees, devoting but a minimum of time to the warehouse business; it paid their
wages and paid no rent to the Warehousing Company; until receipts were issued it
exercised the right to crush and use the seed inventory, unaffected by the warehouse
agreement; there was no actual change of possession of stored property since it was never
handled by the Warehousing Company, nor segregated from the bulk, and was with-
drawn for crushing purposes by mechanical conveyors operated by the bankrupt; the
cottonseed houses were never locked and the bankrupt's operations were not interfered
with by the warehouseman. 23
The court held that as to the cottonseed the warehouse transaction and the ware-
house receipts were valid. As will be discussed below, the warehouse operation was
hqld to be invalid as regards cottonseed products, for the reason that there was a
failure to post appropriate signs or to segregate them from the other property of
the bankrupt? 4
VI
COMMON DEFECrS IN WAREHOUSING OPERATIOS
As was stated in Pittman v. Union Planters National Bank & Trust Company,
it is essential to the validity of a warehousing arrangement that the warehouseman
"have actual, open and exclusive possession" of the goods. Cases illustrative of
the lack of open possession are In re Rodgers, Security Warehousing Company v.
231d. at 21'-23.
2
,McGaffey Canning Co. v. Bank of America, 1o9 Cal. App. 415, 294 Pac. 45 (1930), contains an
exhaustive review of the applicable cases on this subject at pages 426-438 (294 Pac. at 49-54). In that
case the plaintiff appealed from a nonsuit. On his evidence the appellate court held that the existence
of possession was a question of fact, rendered at least open to doubt by reason of such circumstances as
lack of physical segregation of the warehouse from the factory by anything more than an aisle a few
feet wide. Evidence on the part of the defendant to support its claim of actual possession was not before
the court.
25 x25 Fed. x69 (C. C. A. 7th z9o3).
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Hand,2" and In re Spanish-American Cork Products Company. In these and simi-
lar cases, either no sign or other public notice was posted by the warehouse or the
signs were so inconspicuous that they were held to be ineffective.
Cases involving the lack of actual and exclusive possession usually involve both
elements. Typical cases are First Camden National Bank & Trust Company v.
1. R. Watkins Company,2 8 Pittman v. Union Planters National Bank & Trust Com-
pany,29 and Swetnam v. Edmund Wright Ginsberg Corporation.O The Swetnam
case does not involve field warehousing, but does involve the parallel problem of a
purported possessory lien claimed by a factor. The lack of actual and exclusive
possession there should be contrasted with the valid possessory lien which was sus-
tained in In re Nathan & Cohen Company, lnc.?'
The leading case of Benedict v. Ratner32 established the doctrine that a pur-
ported assignment of accounts receivable is invalid where in practice the assignor
is not deprived of unfettered dominion over the accounts. The doctrine was ap-
plied in Lee v. State Bank & Trust Company,43 where the assignor was not deprived
of unfettered dominion over returned merchandise. The same doctrine is applicable
to field-warehousing operations in which the bailor is not deprived of unfettered
dominion over the warehoused goods. If the practice is to allow the borrower free
access to and use of the goods, and if the lender can be charged with knowledge of
the practice and acquiescence in it, the transaction is without validity, although the
lender will be protected if it is without knowledge or notice.34
VII
CONCLUSION
Field warehousing is a useful method by which inventory can be made available
as collateral. It accomplishes the same basic result as a trust receipt, chattel mort-
gage, or conditional-sale contract, but with one significant operating difference.
Under the instruments just referred to, the financing agency customarily relies, as
a practical matter, on the good faith and honesty of the merchant or manufacturer
with regard to disposing of the inventory; if the confidence of the financing agency
has been misplaced, and it is discovered that inventory has been sold without ac-
counting for the proceeds, the financing agency has little or no protection against the
honest purchaser, and a limited claim to proceeds. 5  However, in the field-ware-
housing operation the warehouse is in charge of a custodian who is normally covered
with a fidelity bond. Although he usually is a former employee of the borrower,
so 2o6 U. S. 45 (1907), also involving lack of possession.
"2 F. 2d 203 (C. C. A. 4 th 1924).28 122 F. 2d 826 (C. C. A. 3rd 1941).
so 118 F. 2d 2xI (C. C. A. 6th '94').
so128 F. 2d z (C. C. A. 2d 1942).
31 58 F. 2d 670 (S. D. N. Y. 1932), reVd on another point, Irving Trust Co. v. Commercial Fac-
tors Corp., 68 F. 2d 864 (C. C. A. 2d 1934).
3X 268 U. S. 353 (1925).
32 54 F. 2d 518 (C. C. A. 2d 1931).
"'In re C. A. Taylor Log & Lumber Co., 41 F. 2d 249 (W. D. Wash. 1925).
"See Uniform Trust Receipts Act, §§9, so; x68 A.L.R. 368, supplementing 49 A.L.R. 300, 87 A.L.I
314, and sox A.LR. 46o; 88 A.L.R. zog, supplementing 47 A.L.R. 85.
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the personal responsibility thus focused on an individual seems to be justified by
experience; and in case of doubt such an employee could be replaced by the lender's
own representative.
There is never-ending conflict between the proponents of unsecured credit and
the advocates of secured credit. Apart from litigation, this conflict is well known
to those who have participated in the drafting of statutes relating to the assignment
of accounts receivable, trust receipts, factor's liens, and similar matters. On prin-
ciple, the writer believes that the greater social interest lies in facilitating the granting
of secured credits and in establishing practical procedures whereby this may be
done without legal risk. So long as legal risk is involved, the terms upon which
such credit can be obtained are bound to be expensive, and expensive credit is eco-
nomically wasteful. The establishment of simple and safe procedures removes a
large part of the gamble and enables such credit to be extended by banks and others
who are not gamblers but legitimate merchants of credit. The law should treat field
warehousing as a valid and safe procedure.
